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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
JEROME HALL*
LEGISLATION
Chapter 148 of the Acts of 1941 made several signifi-
cant changes in the substantive criminal law, which were
described in detail in "Indiana Legislation-1941."' That
discussion raised certain questions: (1) whether second de-
gree rape had been impliedly repealed by its omission in the
1941 rape statute; 2 (2) whether felonious intent remains an
element of the statutory grand larceny-the question has
impliedly been answered in the affirmative ;3 (3) whether the
disorderly conduct statute was invalid because of indefinite-
hess.4 The 1941 act on disorderly conduct was repealed in
1943.r The new statute specifies that the act "disturb the
peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or
unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior,
threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or
fighting."a
Chapter 233 of the Acts of 1941 provided for juvenile
courts.7  Penal sections 18 and 19, providing penalties for
encouraging delinquency and for neglect of a child, have been
held unconstitutional as violative of Section 19 Art 4 of the
Indiana Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the
title of the act was not broad enough to "justy the inclusion
of sections declaring, defining . . . felonies and misde-
meanors."8
The 1943 legislature made few enactments affecting
criminal law; the following are the more important ones:
Law poractice. "Unauthorized solicitation" was extended
from bringing a suit for damages in which the accused would
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. (1941) 17 Ind. L. J. 150-160.
2. id. 151-152.
3. id. 153. The question has not been directly presented but ju-
dicial definitions of larceny continue to include felonious intent.
E.g., Warren v. State, - Ind. -, 62 N.E. (2d) 624, 625 (1946).
4. id. 160.
5. Acts 1943, c. 243, §2.
6. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-1510.
7. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1941 Supp.) §9-2801b-9-2861.
8. Stone v. State, 220 Ind. 165, 172, 41 N.E. (2d) 609 (1942).
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receive compensation dependent upon the amount of recovery
to any "employment as attorney." The maximum fine was
increased from $100 to $500; both fine and imprisonment
may be imposed.9
Sunday Laws. Hunting on Sunday with firearms is prohib-
ited.10 (In 1941, fishing was deleted from the list of occu-
pations prohibited on Sunday.)"
Defrauding newsboys. "Any person who obtains newspapers
from person under eighteen years of age engaged in selling
newspapers at retail, without paying therefor, with intent
to defraud such person selling newspapers, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and may upon conviction, be imprisoned
not to exceed thirty days, or fined in any sum not exceeding
twenty-five dollars." 2  "Proof that any person refused or
neglected to pay for such newspapers upon demand shall
be prima facie evidence of the fraudulent intent contemplat-
ed in this act.""3
Weapons. Exceptions were made for members of the In-
diana State Guard, law enforcement officers of this State
or of the United States, persons testing or using fireworks,
and ordinance manufacturers. 4 The procedure for securing
a license to carry firearms was changed. 5
The emergency acts of 1945 legislature contain few
changes in the substantive criminal law; the following are
the most important ones:
Intoxicating Liquor Offenses. Chapter 357 §7, Emergency
Acts of 1945, prohibits selling to members of the armed
forces in knowing violation of military regulations-6 and
9. Ind. Stat. Anno., (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-3110-11. "Evidence
that any person charged with violation of this act, either (1)
was not a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Indiana, or(2) was not a member of the bar of the county in which the
offense was committed, at the time the offense was committed,
shall be prima facie evidence that such person was not admitted
to the bar of this state." Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.)
§10-3110.
10. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-4303.
11. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1941 Supp.) §10-4301.
12. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-2122.
13. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-2123.
14. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-4714.
15. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-4738.
16. § Ta.
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restates without substantial modification the offenses speci-
fied under the expressly repealed Chapter 226, Acts of 1935.17
The gradation in penalties for various violations of the In-
toxicating Liquor laws has been eliminated. Any person
viotlating any of the penal sections is subject to a fine not
exceeding $500 or six months' imprisonment or both.
Electwn Offenses. Chapter 208, Acts 1945, the Indiana Elec-
tion Code, forbids the buying or selling of votes, influencing
voters not to vote, bribing voters, falsifying expense records,
participating in corrupt election practices, interfering with
the process of election, etc. The penalty for misdemeanors
defined under the act is a fine not exceeding $500 or im-
prisonment from 30 days to 1 year or both; in addition
disfranclusement up to 5 years is discretionary. The penalty
for felonies defined under the act is a fine not less than
$50 and not more than $1,000 with imprisonment from 1
to 5 years and discretionary terminate disfranchisement.
Blind Persons. A guarantee of "full privileges of all public
conveyance and all places of public accommodation" was
made more definite by specific reference to "hotels, lodging
places, amusement or resort and other places to which the
general public is invited." 1iS The penalties for depriving any
such person of these rights were increased; the fine from
$25 to $100, imprisonment from 60 days to 3 months, or both.
Miscellaneous Provisions
Chapter 11 of the Acts of 1945 allows each prosecuting
attorney in each judicial circuit $600 a year from Jan. 1,
1945, to Mar. 31, 1947, as reimbursement for expenses in-
curred.19
Chapter 38 of the Acts of 1945 created the office of
Public Defender. Appointment of a resident of Indiana,
a practicing lawyer for at least 3 years, is to be made by
the Supreme Court. Service is "at pleasure" of the court
17. See Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1941 Supp.) §§12-601-12-621. A
sale to any person under 21 is prohibited (§Mb.), but notice in
writing that a minor is under 21 is required to make the per-
mitted presence of such a person on the premises unlawful (07 e).
18. Chap. 34 of Acts of 1945 amending Chap. 193 of Acts of 1937.
19. Compensation of prosecuting attorneys is strictly limited to stat-




for a term of 4 years at a salary not to exceed $5,000. The
duty of the public defender is "to represent any person in
any penal institution who is without funds to employ his own
counsel in any matter in which he may assert "after his
time for appeal shall have expired," that he was "unlawfully
and illegally inprisoned. '20
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
General Defenses
The presumption of coercion by husband was tacitly
recognized in a case of perjury.21  On trial for vagrancy,
riot, etc., the defendant pleaded that she was the wife of
the co-defendant and that it must therefore be presumed that
she was acting under coercion when she did the acts charged
against her. She was discharged.
The defense of reasonable mistake of fact was extended
to defense of members of one's family: "'A person has a
right to act on appearance, and if he believes, in good faith
and upon reasonable ground, from the facts and circum-
stances as they appear to him at the time, that he is about
to be assaulted, he has a right, . . . to use such force as
will protect him from the assault.' This right also extends
to the protection of one's family.i2'
Certain features of the defense of insanity have been
clarified. After a special plea of insanity has been made,
the burden is "upon the state to prove sanity of defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt." It was reversible error to
instruct that the jury must find the defendant insane at
the time of the act rather than to acquit if they entertained
a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.23 But the "presumption
of sanity is sufficient to constitute a prima facie case in
favor of the State where there is no evidence to dispute it"
20. Sec. 2. The duties are apparently limited to pursuit of a coram
nobis.
21. Davis v. State, 218 Ind. 506, 34 N.E. (2d) 23 (1941) (by implica-
tion). The charge of perjury was based on the defendant's testimony
in the vagrancy trial as to the time and place of the marriage.
22. Brannm v. State, 221 Ind. 123, 124, 46 N.E. (2d) 599 (1943)(manslaughter) extending Hughes v. State, 212 Ind. 577, 585,
586, 10 N.E. (2d) 629, 633 (1937) (assault and battery).
23. Sweet v. State, 218 Ind. 182, 190, 31 N.E. (2d) 993 (1941).
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even though a special plea of insanity has been entered.2
The Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of evidence of
glandular imbalance offered in a rape case to prove that a
person "with such . . . would not know what he was
doing or remember what he had done." The contention had
been made that the evidence would tend to "show an 'irresist-
able urge' and thus a partial lack of responsibility." It was
decided that abnormal, physical conditions cannot be urged
"as a partial defense, unless . . . mental condition is there-
by affected to the extent of being unsound, and a proper
plea filed. ' 25  In a later murder case in which no plea of
insanity was interposed, the Supreme Court held that "a
fair presentation of the case required the giving of the in-
struction upon temporary insanity submitted by the de-
fense., 26
Intoxication is a defense only to the extent of dis-
proving such crimes as require "a specific intent.27
Specific Offenses
Criminal Syndicalism and Riotous Conspiracy
Members of Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted for con-
spiracy to incite the people against all forms of organized
government and to disrespect the flag of the United States.
The conviction was reversed 28 on the ground that neither
statute under which the charge was made had been violated.
The general conspiracy statute requires a conspiracy to com-
mit a felony: desecration of the flag is a misdemeanor; and
there is "no such statutory offense as conspiracy to commit
a misdemeanor."2 9  The literature advocating overthrow of
all government did not "advocate, or incite the overthrow,
24. Brattain v. State, - Ind. - , 61 N.E. (2d) 462, 465 (1945)(Second degree murder.)
25. Foster v. State, 222 Ind. 133, 52 N.E. (2d) 358 (1944).
26. Miller v. State, - Ind. - , 58 N.E. (2d) 114, 116 (1944).
The defense had contended that immediately after the shot was
accidentally fired, the defendant became temporarily insane, and
that for that reason little, if any, consideration should be given
to his statements made immediately thereafter.
27. " . . . when the degree of intoxication is such as to render a
person incapable of entertaining a specific intent it is an ef-
fective defense as to such crimes." Brattain v. State, - Ind.
-, 61 N.E. (2d) 462, 465 (1945).
28. McKee v. State, 219 Ind. 247, 37 N.E. (2d) 940 (1941). See
Note (1942) 17 Ind. L. J. 435.
29. See Ind. Stat Anno. (Burns' 1983) i§10-1101, 10-506.
39519461
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by use of force and violence."30 At the tine this decision
was rendered the much publicized case, Minersville School
Distrct v. Gobitis, had not been reversed. Thus the Indiana.
Supreme Court anticipated the United States Supreme Court
in arriving at a sound judgment that strengthened highly
important civil liberties.
Homzczde
The Indiana murder statute incorporates, in certain sit-
uations, the felony-murder doctrine.31 ". . neither pre-
meditation, intent to kill, nor malice is a necessary element
-32 To sustain a conviction under this section, it is
sufficient if "the facts disclosed no motive . . . but rob-
bery." 3  The felony-murder section was held applicable to
accessories before or after the felony.3 4 Thus, an automobile
salesman, taking a prospective buyer for a ride, waited while
his passenger, a stranger, went to "stick-up" a filling sta-
tion. The filling-station attendant died of gunshot wounds.
The automobile salesman was convicted of murder in the
attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The conviction was af-
firmed: "It is immaterial that appellant did not know nor
expect that Hafer would shoot in the attempt at robbery.
They were together engaged in the commisison of an unlaw-
ful act and he is liable cr mmaliter for that which Hafer did
in furtherance of the unlawful common object. '35 The sec-
tion is, however, strictly limited to the enumerated felonies;
"robbery" in the murder section does not include "bank rob-
bery."36
A related doctrine has been evolved to cover situations
in which the felony-murder section is strictly inapplicable
30. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §10-1302.
31. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1941 Supp.) §10-3401 ". . provided,
whoever m the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a rape,
arson, robbery or burglary . . .
32. Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind. 116, 125, 126, 37 N.E. (2d) 79 (1941).
It was held that the tral court properly refused to instruct that,
under an indictment for murder while in perpetration of a rob-
bery, the defendant could be convicted of murder in second de-
gree, manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.
33. Finch v. State, 222 Ind. 633, 638, 56 N.E. (2d) 851 (1944).
34. See Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §9-102.
35. White v. State, 219 Ind. 290, 297, 37 N.E. (2d) 937 (1941).
following Breaz v. State, 214 Ind. 31, 13 N.E. (2d) 952 (1938).
36. Loftus v. State, 222 Ind. 139, 52 N.E. (2d) 488 (1944).
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because the intended felony has been fully perpetrated. When
a victim of a prior felony dies as a result of an otherwise
intervening act, the dependence of that act upon the psy-
chological distress produced by the crime is made the basis
for finding the wrongdoer responsible. Thus, as a result of
having been ravished by the defendant, and "while in the
throes of bodily pain and mental grief and distraction caused
therefrom," an 11-year old girl fell or jumped into a stream
from which the defendant "intentionally failed and refused
to rescue her, although he was fully able to rescue her."
The conviction of second degree murder was affirmed. "The
question, however, is not so much one of duty and breach
thereof as one of cause and effect. '37  The failure to rescue
the child was "one link in a chain of causation, beginning
with defendant's wrongful acts and leading directly to the
death of the child."
Recent second degree murder cases have emphasized
"the necessity of proving malice and intent. '3 8 Similarly, it
was error to instruct the jury that "if the killing of the
person . . . has been satisfactorily shown . . to have
been the act of the defendant, then the law presumes it to
have been murder . . ." This instruction erroneously
"eliminates the necessity of proving malice and intent. The
'law' never presumes murder under any state of fact."3 9
The Reckless Homicide Statute40 was declared valid
against the contention that the phrase "reckless disregard
for the safety of others" was indefinite. The phrase had "a
definite meaning at common law and was therefore suffi-
ciently certain." 41 The judicial definiton given a correspond-
ing phrase in the Guest Statute was presumptively known to
the legislature. 4? The death must be "proximately caused
by the acts described.143
37. Jones v. State, 220 Ind. 384, 386, 387, 43 N.E. (2d) 1017 (1942),
following Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1932).
38. Dickinson v. State, 222 Ind. 551, 555, 55 N.E. (2d) 325 (1944).
39. Miller v. State, - Ind. - , 58 N.E. (2d) 114, 116 (1944).
40. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1937) §47-2001.
41. State v. Beckman, 219 Ind. 176, 186, 37 N.E. (2d) 531 (1941).
See Noto (1940) 30 Geo. L. J. 408.
42. id. 184 ". . . voluntarily does an improper or wrongful act, or
with knowledge of existing conditions, voluntarily refrains from
doing a proper and prudent act, under circumstances when his
action, or his failure to act, evinces an active abandonment of
any care, and a heedless indifference to results which may fol-
low, . . ." Armstrong vs. Binzer, 102 Ind. App. 497, 507, 199




The penalty for reckless homicide is less than that in-
posed for involuntary manslaughter. Both crimes may be
charged in one affidavit or indictment. Two cases show
interesting applications of these statutes. A conviction for
reckless homicide on a charge of "driving at a rate of speed
which was greater than reasonable and prudent . . . to-
wit: 89 miles per hour knowing that brakes were in poor
working order" was reversed because of failure to prove
that the brakes were defective. Evidence of unreasonable
speed was insufficient. "Both elements, speed and inade-
quate brakes, were essential to establish the crime charged
in the affidavit."' 44 In contrast, a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter was affirmed on evidence "from which the
jury could draw an inference that the unlawful speed at
which the appellant operated the automobile was the proxi-
mate cause of the death." The defendant, driving at 60
miles per hour, saw a child when his automobile was more
than 30 feet from her, sounded his horn and applied the
brakes but the child was struck. Tests by police showed that
at 30 miles per hour, the car could have been controlled in
due time.45
Mayhem. "Construed in the light of the common law," "in-
tent to break a leg" is "insufficient because it does not
imply a permanent injury. '46
Kidnap png. A convict detained a visitor at the prison hos-
pital for two hours, threatening to kill her unless he was
liberated and given an automobile and a machine gun. He
was convicted of kidnapping for ransom. 7 Although the
lesser crime of kidnapping48 requires proof of an intention
to carry away "from any place within this state," kidnapping
for ransom does not.49  The statute incorporates the com-
44. Turrell v. State, 221 Ind. 662, 670, 666, 51 N.E. (2d) 359 (1943).
45. Cross v. State, 222 Ind. 241, 243, 52 N.E. (2d) 727 (1944).
46. Pierce v. State, 220 Ind. 225, 226, 41 N.E. (2d) 797 (1942).
Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §10-407 "or disable a limb . .";§10-408, ". . . deprives another of the use of any bodily mem-
ber . . "
47. Sweet v. State, 218 Ind. 182, 31 N.E. (2d) 993 (1941) (convic-
tion reversed on other grounds).
48. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1941 Supp.) §10-2901.
49. "Whoever shall imprison, detain or hold any person at any placein this state with intent of obtaining from anyone any money,
means, property or thing of value, as ransom, reward or price
for return, liberation or surrender of person so imprisoned, de-
tamed or held. " Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1941 Supp..
§10-2903.
[V9ol. 21
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mon law crime of false imprisonment.50 A consequence of
this conclusion is that the "'lesser' offense of kidnapping
is not included in the 'greater' offense of kidnapping for
ransom."' "Ransom" is not limited to money demands.-'
"Property" is broad enough to include a machine gun and
automobile and both are within definitions of "things of
value." "The purpose for which they were to be used, in
our opinion, was immaterial."' '
Failure to Support Parent. A person, who, as a child, was
supported by his parents only until emancipation does not
come within the statute.54 No legal obligation exists unless
the child has been supported "throughout minority. 55
Theft. In distinguishing between larceny by trick and ob-
taining property by false pretenses, the Court held that "The
fact that the owner intends to part with the title to the
property and not merely the possession makes the distinction
"t The distinction between custody and possession
as a basis for distinguishing larceny from embezzlement has
been emphasized in a recent decision. An "employee who
has 'mere custody of personal property, as distinguished from
50. Sweet v. State, 218 Ind. 182, 193-4, 31 N.E. (2d) 993 (1941).
For comparable construction of kidnapping statutes as analogous
to aggravated false imprisonment, see Fisher and McGuire, "Kid-
napping and the So-Called Lindbergh Law" (1935) 12 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 646.
51. id. 193.
52. Cp. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
53. Sweet v. State, 218 Ind. 182, 196, 31 N.E. (2d) 993 (1941)
54. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1942 Replacement) §10-1410: .
the provisions of this act shall not apply to children who have
not lived with or who have not been supported by their parents
when . . .minors."
55. Hindman et al. v. State, 221 Ind. 611, 50 N.E. (2d) 1913 (1943).
The court admitted the moral obligation but "in the
absence of some language of qualification or limitation in the
statute itself there is no basis for judicial compromise. The pro-
visions of penal statutes such as this may not be extended by
intendment." id. 613.
56. Johnson v. State, 222 Ind. 473, 54 N.E. (2d) 273 (1944). Parties
conducting community sales of livestock delivered possession of
livestock purchased by the defendant in exchange for a check,
accepted as full payment. Payments on the check were stopped
by the defendant's wife who had not been informed that her
husband was issuing checks in her name. After attempting to
collect the check from the wife, the seller filed a complaint. A
conviction for grand larceny was reversed on the ground that
the offense committed was obtaining property by false pretences.
The seller intended to part with title.
1946] 399
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legal possession' and with animo furandi converts same to
his own use is guilty of larceny -57 A member of a corpor-
ation's maintenance crew, bonded for embezzlement, re-
moved the property from the storage building to which he
had a key but from which he was not allowed to remove
property without procuring a requisition. He sold and di-
vided the proceeds with an accomplice. The Court sustained
a conviction of larceny, holding that the embezzlement stat-
ute was limited to "cases in which such persons have, as an
element of their employment, a special trust concerning the
money, article, or thing of value that involves an actual
possession thereof or a special right of access to or control
over the same."58
Felonious intent, though not expressly required in the
statute,5 9 remains a requisite of embezzlement. 5 The fel-
onious intent may be inferred from shortages in sales records
and receipts that are not accounted for.6 Certain clarifications
have been made in the scope of embezzlement by private
employees. Thus chattels are now definitely the subject
matter of embezzlement.62 But difficulties persist in the
distinction between larceny and embezzlementG3 and in the
definition of an agency relationship. Thus a person who
accepts money which he knows is to be paid to a third person
becomes an agent to deliver. It is not necessary to prove
that he "agreed to act as agent and employee, since his con-
sent to act . . may be implied from his acceptance of the
57. Warren v. State, - Ind. - , 62 N.E. (2d) 624, 625 (1945).
See Note (1945) - Ind. L. J. -
58. id. 625.
59. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §§10-1701, 10-1704.
60. Lawyer v. State, 221 Ind. 101, 46 N.E. (2d) 592 (1943) A
deputy treasurer took $30 from a cash drawer in the county
treasurer's office, depositing in lieu a personal check which he
later cashed for the same amount. A conviction for embezzle-
ment of county funds was reversed on the ground that there was
"no evidence that supports an inference of criminal or evil intent
or intent to abstract or misappropriate or deprive the county of
its funds." id. 106.
61. Hurst v. State, 222 Ind. 599, 56 N.E. (2d) 493 (1944). Cp. Ind.
Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1943 Supp.) §10-2123: Prima Facie Evi-
dence of Intent to Defraud Newsboys.
62. Gentry v. State, - Ind. - , 61 N.E. (2d) 641 (1915) impliedly
overruling Mendenhall v. State, 189 Ind. 175, 126 N.E. 434 (1920),
expressly overruled in Warren v. State, - Ind. - , 62 N.E.(2d) 624, 625 (1945)
63. See especially Warren v. State, - Ind. - , 62 N.E. (2d) 624(1945).
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money. 6 4 On the other hand, a person who expressly agrees
to sell property belonging to another and to turn over im-
mediately the proceeds of the sale to the owner is "not an
agent for sale of goods and servant for delivery of proceeds
of sale."115
Receiving Stolen Goods. The statute66 defines two distinct
offenses: receiving stolen goods and receiving embezzled
goods. A conviction for receiving stolen goods was reversed
because the evidence established receipt of embezzled good. 6 7
Converting Mortgaged Personal Property. The statute68 de-
fines two distinct offenses: removal of mortgaged property
from the county where it is situated, without the written
consent of the mortgagee; secreting or converting mortgaged
chattels. A farmer who had mortgaged his growing crop
of corn "converted mortgaged property" to his own use "by
turning his livestock into the field and permitting them to
consume it."69
Issuing Fraudulent Check. The statute7 0 defines two distinct
offenses: issuing a fraudulent check to obtain property and
issuing a fraudulent check in payment of an obligation. A
defendant who gave a fraudulent check in payment for a
steer was convicted of issuing a fraudulent check in pay-
ment of an obligation. The conviction was reversed on the
ground that the offense committed was issuing a fraudulent
check to obtain property:
1
64. Hart v. State, 220 Ind. 469, 485-6, 44 N.E. (2d) 346 (1942)
(conviction for embezzlement affirmed); Jones v. State, 59 Ind.
229 (1877).
65. Sheets v. State, 217 Ind. 676, 680, 30 N.E. (2d) 309 (1940)
(conviction for embezzlement reversed). The decision, insofar as it
relates to the problem of agency is complicated by the fact that
the defendant was a conditional sales vendee acting at the re-
quest of the conditional sales vendor.
66. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §10-3017.
67. Gentry v. State, - Ind. -, 61 N.E. (2d) 641 (1945)
Noted (1945) - Ind. L. J. -.
68. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §10-4004.
69. Sheets v. State, 217 Ind. 277, 279, 281, 27 N.E. (2d) 769 (1940).
70. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §10-2105.
71. Rogers v. State, 220 Ind. 443, 445, 44 N.E. (2d) 343 (1942),




Affidavit and Indictment. Pleading of separate and distinct
offenses, created by separate and distinct sections of a stat-
ute, or by separate statutes is generally forbidden.7 2  But
"where a criminal statute enumerates several acts disjunc-
tively, and provides the same punishment for doing any one
or all of the acts, then two or more said acts may be charged
conjunctively in a single count without objection for du-
plicity.' ' 73 "Proof of any one of several acts forbidden and
charged conjunctively will support conviction. '74 Where a
statute defines two distinct offenses, an affidavit may prop-
erly be based upon either.7- But when a statute defines two
distinct offenses, "it necessarily follows that evidence of one
is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of the other.' '7 6
Power of Court to Amend. "The court may at any time
before, during or after the trial amend the indictment or
affidavit in respect to any defect, imperfection or omission
in form, providing no change is made in the name or identity
of the defendant or defendants or of the crime sought to be
charged. ' ' 7 "If however, the original affidavit was not suf-
ficient to charge the crime . . . the amendment of the af-
fidavit during the course of the trial constituted 'reversible
error.' "78 An amendment of an affidavit charging assault
and battery to charge assault and battery with intent to kill
was held erroneous because the change was "from a misde-
meanor to a felony. ' '7 9  The Court expressly reserved the
72. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §9-1112.
73. Strickland v. State, 217 Ind. 588, 591, 29 N.E. (2d) 950 (1940)(fraudulently forging and uttering a conditional sales contract).
74. Cooprider v. State, 218 Ind. 122, 31 N.E. (2d) 53 (1941), 132
A.L.R. 553, 557 (1941). Under a statute prohibiting "wilfully,
nmschievously or maliciously removing tombstone," proof of wilful
removal was sufficient to support conviction on an indictment
charging wilful, mischievous and malicious removal. id. 126.
75. Sheets v. State, 217 Ind. 277, 27 N.E. (2d) 769 (1940).
76. Rogers v. State, 220 Ind. 443, 44 N.E. (2d) 343 (1942), 143 A.
L.R. 1074, 1076 (1942). See note: "Required application of sec-
tion more specifically applying to the accused." (1935) 10 Ind.
L.J. 467.
77. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1941 Supp.) §9-1133. Ind. Stat. Anno.(Burns' 1942 Replacement) §9-1124: "before the defendant
pleads . . "
78. Edwards v. State, 220 Ind. 490, 493, 44 N.E. (2d) 304 (1942).
The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the purposes of
such legislation.
79. Drury v. State, - Ind. - , 59 N.E. (2d) 116 (1945).
[Vol. 21
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question of whether such amendment would be erroneous if
made without objection. The statute has been limited to
the immaterial defects specified in the Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns'
1933) §9-1127.
Plea of Guilty. "A verified motion to vacate a judgment
entered on a plea of guilty raises the issue as to whether the
plea of guilty was freely and understandingly made but
does not tend to prove it.' '8° The question is one of fact for
the trial court.81 A motion for a new trial is ineffectual in
a case where judgment had been rendered upon a plea of
guilty.82 A petition to set aside a judgment on a plea of
guilty or for permission to substitute a plea of not guilty,
filed after the term in which judgment was entered, was
filed too late.83
Motion to Quash. Where an affidavit brought against an
habitual criminal, charges prior convictions, sentences, and
imprisonment but does not designate the place of imprison-
ment, this motion should be sustained.
Plea in Abatement. Mere "irregularities in drawing and
organizing the grand jury which involved no charge of fraud
or., corruption and in no way prejudiced defendant's substan-
tial rights, assuming, in absence of anything appearing to
the contrary, that the body as constituted was composed of
persons duly examined and qualified and not subject to any
statutory causes of challenge, is not available as a plea to
abate an indictment."85 A plea in abatement is a proper
method to assert immunity from prosecution of an offense
regarding which the defendant had been compelled to testify
before the grand jury."
80. Kuhn v. State, 222 Ind. 179, 52 N.E. (2d) 491 (1944).
81. Hoelscher v. State, - Ind. - , 57 N.E. (2d) 770 (1944).
82. Chaplain v. State, 219 Ind. 55, 36 N.E. (2d) 277 (1941).
83. State ex rel. Thomas v. Murray, Judge, 219 Ind. 461, 39 N.E.(2d) 450 (1942); Sessler v. State, 222 Ind. 608, 56 N.E. (2d)
851 (1944).
84. Midland v. State, 220 Ind. 668, 46 N.E. (2d) 200 (1943). The
date of conviction and sentence in a federal court was given.
85. Anderson v. State, 218 Ind. 299, 32 N.E. (2d) 705 (1941). So
held, also, where a court ordered the names of twelve persons
instead of six to be drawn. Weer v. State, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.(2d) 787 (1941).




Separate Trial. Granting a change of venue to one of several
defendants, jointly charged, does not of itself entitle any of
them to a separate trial.
87
Double Jeopardy. This may be proved under a plea of not
guilty 88 Failure to object to the discharge of the jury fore-
closes the defendant's taking advantage of a court's dis-
charging a jury after jeopardy has attached.8
Motton for Continuance. One who claims surprise at the ad-
mission of testimony against him must ask for postponement
of the trial or a continuance so that he may be prepared to
meet such testimony. Surprise at testimony introduced is
not a ground for a new trial.90
Directed Verdict for the Accused. "A peremptory instruction
directing verdict in favor of accused in the trial of a crim-
inal case can only be given where there is a total absence
of evidence upon some essential issue, or where there is no
conflict in the evidence, and it is susceptible of but one in-
ference, and that in favor of accused."'9
Motion for Discharge. The Indiana Bill of Rights, Art. 1
§12 provides that "J.ustice shall be administered . speed-
ily, and without delay." The statute embodying this provi-
sion' "prescribes no procedure and therefore must be gov-
erned by the procedure applicable to other similar issues
presented by motion."'93 The defendant "must allege that
the delay was without his fault." "The motion itself is not
proof even when it is verified."' 4 The State is not answer-
able for "delay . . caused by pleas in abatement, efforts
to change venue, etc."' 5 Failure to ask for a trial constitutes
a waiver insofar as it is "silent acquiescence in delay "9
87. Weer v. State, 219 Ind. 217, 224, 36 N.E. (2d) 787 (1941). See
Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §9-1804.
88. Marks v. State, 220 Ind. 9, 21, 40 N.E. (2d) 108 (1941).
89. Holt v. State, - Ind. - , 59 N.E. (2d) 563, 564 (1945) (con-
tinuance requested by defendant).
90. Mosier v. State, 219 Ind. 669, 40 N.E. (2d) 698 (1941).
91. State v. Torphy, 217 Ind. 383, 388, 28 N.E. (2d) 70 (1940).
92. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) §9-1402-3.
93. State v. Beckwith, 222 Ind. 618, 624, 57 N.E. (2d) 193 (1944).
94. Soucie v. State, 218 Ind. 215, 226, 31 N.E. (2d) 1018, 1022 (1941).
95. Weer v. State, 219 Ind. 217, 225, 36 N.E. (2d) 787 (1941).
96. State v. Beckwith, 222 Ind. 618, 632, 57 N.E. (2d) 193 (1944).
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Waiver of Presence. Voluntary absence of the defendant is
not ground for a new trial.9
Counsel. Even though the defendant is not a pauper, "a
request of attorneys of record to withdraw their appearance
on the eve of the trial ought to have been denied or the trial
postponed sufficiently long for new counsel who were willing
to appear to familiarize themselves with the case." 918 A
pauper has the right to have counsel to perfect and prosecute
an appeal.9 9 A pauper's counsel will not be furnished to pur-
sue a writ of coram nobis; there is "no duty on the state to
aid a pauper" in "a new proceeding, civil in nature,-a rem-
edy by which relief may be had from an unconscionable
judgment."'10 The recently created office of Public Defender
alters the situation as regards writs of coram nobis.
97. At time of the return of the verdict. Dudley et al. v. State,
218 Ind. 131, 30 N.E. (2d) 718 (1941).
98. Rice v. State, 220 Ind. 523, 44 N.E. (2d) 829 (1941), on the
basis of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
99. State ex rel. White v. Hilgemann, Judge, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.(2d) 129 (1941). See Johnson v. Zerbst, Warden, 304 U.S. 458(1938).
100. State ex rel. Cutsmger v. Spencer, Judge, 219 Ind. 148, 155,
41 N.E. (2d) 601 (1941) (murder); State ex rel. Sawa v. Crim-
mal Court of Lake County, 220 Ind. 4, 40 N.E. (2d) 971 (1942)
(murder).
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